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Abstract
Conventional economic modelling is frequently criticized for being “unrealistic” due to
the variety of unrealistic assumptions that underpin many models. Critics frequently wonder how
models that are unrealistic or false can accurately explain economic phenomena. This criticism
and the problem it presents for economics is captured by Julian Reiss’s “explanation paradox.”
This paper aims to evaluate Reiss’s paradox and assess the problems it poses for economics as a
positive science. To address this problem, I survey a variety of competing strategies offered by
philosophers and economists before critically evaluating the validity of the paradox. I conclude
that while economic models cannot be considered explanatory because they do not completely
and accurately identify the causes of economic phenomena, they still offer understanding that is
valuable for informing economic policy.
Introduction
In economic theory, a “model” is an abstract, visual representation of a theoretical
relationship between multiple economic variables such as price and quantity, demand for goods x
and y, inflation and unemployment, and so on. Popular criticisms of conventional economic
theory often take aim at the characteristics of economic modelling which critics deem
“unrealistic” or “false,” meaning that they are not descriptively accurate representations of
economic phenomena as they exist in the real world. If correct, this criticism appears to spell
trouble for the epistemic value of economic modelling. Intuition tells us that if a description of a
particular phenomenon is inaccurate, it cannot be the case that the description offers us an
accurate explanation or understanding of what that phenomenon is, how it works, or how it could
be used for practical purposes. The intuition that this criticism touches on is best captured by the
“Explanation Paradox,” an idea coined by the German philosopher and economist Julian Reiss.
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Reiss’s paradox can be summarized by the combination of the following three contradictory
premises:
(1) Economic models are false.
(2) Economic models are nevertheless explanatory
(3) Only true accounts can explain1
If sound, this paradox demonstrates that economic models are doomed to fail to explain
economic phenomena. The problems this poses for economics as an explanatory science are
clear, but it must also be noted that the explanatory failure this paradox alleges carries
considerable real-world consequences if the paradox is valid. Public policy is heavily influenced
by prevailing economic expertise, which is in turn influenced by economic modelling.2 If these
models are neither true nor explanatory, it seems unreasonable to expect them to be effective in
bringing about their intended outcomes. Addressing the paradox’s validity thus carries
importance both for resolving economics’s methodological soundness and for guiding the
appropriateness of conventional economic modelling’s use in guiding public policy.
This paper is presented in four parts: first, we will elaborate on conventional criticisms of
the completeness and accuracy of economic models and the problems they present for
modelling’s explanatory power. Once this is done, we will survey a variety of competing
strategies various economists and philosophers have offered for either resolving the paradox or
addressing the apparent problems it poses for economic methodology. With those scholars’
insights in mind, we will then re-examine and attempt to resolve the paradox through a critical
examination of its second and third points, “economic models are nevertheless explanatory” and
Julian Reiss, “The Explanation Paradox.” Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 19, No. 1,
March 2012, 43–62
1

Isabel. "We Need to Rethink our Economic Assumptions." Brookings. The Brookings
Institution, last modified May 7
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“only true accounts can explain.” Finally, we will conclude by considering our findings’
relevance for policy.
The Falseness of Economic Models
When a critic of economics describes an economic model as ‘false’ or ‘unrealistic,’ what
characteristics of the model is she referring to, specifically? The answer largely depends on who
the critic is and which model she is referring to, but most criticisms, especially those directed at a
model’s explanatory power rather than its practical use, can be sorted into two categories: those
that take aim at a model’s abstractness and those that take aim at its idealization.3 If a model
carries these traits in abundance, it fails to be an accurate reflection of the world it describes. A
model is abstract if it is deliberately mathematized or otherwise formalized to a degree to which
it omits “certain properties or factors” and becomes only a true picture of an abstract world, but
not of the real world which it purports to explain.4 A model is idealized if it “exaggerates or
distorts certain properties or factors” in its representation of the system it purports to explain.5
Models often acquire this property through their use of assumptions to preserve their formal
coherence. It is not difficult for one who has studied economics to name the ubiquitous
unrealistic assumptions found in economic models. For instance, a model of consumer choice
assumes that consumers possess perfect information about the relevant characteristics of what
they want to buy and that they have complete, monotonic, transitive preferences between the
various goods available to them. Similarly, a model of a perfectly competitive market assumes a
large number of participants, homogeneous products, perfect access to information among
D. Wade Hands, "Hypothetical Pattern Explanations in Economic Science: Hayek’s
Explanation of the Principle and Pattern Prediction Meets Contemporary Philosophy of Science.”
In Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology. Published online: 04 May
2018; 37-56.
4
Reiss, 50
5
Reiss, 47
3
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consumers and sellers, and no barriers to entry into the market. It is by no means impossible to
find real-world cases that satisfy assumptions like these, but problems with technical accuracy
arise when models incorporating these assumptions are used to analyze cases where they do not
apply perfectly, or when case-specific operating factors are not adequately accounted for.6
Consider the example of a model of rational consumer choice under conditions of risk for
a risk averse individual:

This model diagrams a scenario where an individual, x, is considering making an expenditure
under a condition of risk, such as purchasing a lottery ticket. The x-axis represents the expected
value x will receive from the expenditure, which is calculated by multiplying the probability of a
certain return by the monetary value of that return. The y-axis represents the personal utility a
person receives from undertaking that risky expenditure. The Utility(Value) function represents
the relationship between these two variables for the individual, x. We say that x is risk averse
6

Rodrik, Dani. 2015. Economics Rules. 1. ed. ed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 96
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because this model shows x g aining more utility from the expected value of this expenditure than
the amount of utility they expect to receive after undergoing the expenditure. In other words,
their risk preferences are such that they would prefer to receive the amount of money that this
risky expense is “worth” than to run the risk of receiving less than its expected value in exchange
for a chance of receiving greater than its expected value.
What is wrong with representing x’s choice situation this way? Like with many economic
models, this representation is idealized and abstracted to a point where the story it tells about
one’s decision-making behavior is questionable. Its abstract qualities are clear: a well-behaved
function for Utility(value) requires a complete account of this individual’s preferences among
different levels of risk and an assumption of perfectly rational preferences between those levels
of risk. Additionally, a real person’s utility function‒if one could be constructed‒would almost
certainly not carry the elegant convexity or monotonicity of those seen in microeconomics
textbooks. The model is heavily idealized as well. Factors that would influence an individual’s
risk preferences at a given moment or even render them irrational, such as mood or influence by
advertisement, are not accounted for. Additionally, the notion of “expected value,” how it’s
calculated, and how it’s applied in judging an individual as “risk averse” or “risk loving” is
strikingly normative, and it implies the obviously false premise that an individual either
consciously or subconsciously compares the mathematical concepts of expected utility and
expected value when considering a risky choice.7 None of this is to say that this model is useless.
In particular, an estimation of a risk preference function computed using values collected from a
real person’s decisions under conditions of risk would be helpful for making inferences about
what that individual might do in choice situations not yet observed. However, the model’s
Hausman, Daniel M. 2007. The Philosophy of Economics. 3. ed. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University, 79
7
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heavily abstracted representation of the phenomenon it describes and its omission of crucial
causal factors appears to severely limit its use in offering an accurate explanatory account of that
phenomenon.
The failure of models such as this one to adequately capture all causal mechanisms
operating in the systems which they hope to describe presents problems for their use in
explaining those systems, especially in novel cases when such systems have operative parts
which are unique to their own case and were not anticipated by the models corresponding to the
kind of phenomenon that it is. That being said, discerning a model’s success or failure at
“explaining” something requires an established definition of what “explanation” means. The
account of explanation discussed by Julian Reiss is one that principally deals with causes. Under
this definition, an explanation is successful if and only if it identifies the causal mechanisms at
play in a given phenomenon: “To explain a specific economic event isto cite its causes; to
explain a general economic phenomenon is to describe the causal mechanism responsible for it.”8
Reiss goes on to note that this particular account of explanation presents a unique challenge for
economics relative to other sciences:
The requirement that causal accounts be true to be explanatory is in fact the great
downside of causal explanation. When phenomena are complex, and economic
phenomena are, truth is hard to come by. Accounts given of economic phenomena are
usually dramatically simplified and features we know affect a result are represented in a
systematically distorted way. Among economists, the slogan ‘all models are wrong, but
some are useful’ is well-known.9

8
9
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The question is thus raised if it’s possible for economic models to offer explanatory power, and
thus understanding, despite their systemic distortion, abstractness, and idealization.
Competing Strategies
Many economists’ and philosophers’ answer to the logical tension articulated in the
explanation paradox proceeds by challenging the definition of explanation that it adopts: a model
explains if and only if it gives a complete and accurate causal account of the phenomenon it
targets. Suppose that it is not the case that for a model to provide explanation of a phenomenon,
it must provide a complete and accurate description of that phenomenon’s causes. If this is true,
then it is not necessarily the case that a model fails to be explanatory merely because its idealized
or abstract characteristics deprive it of insight into a phenomenon’s causes.10 Arguments such as
these are a promising direction for resolving Reiss’s explanation paradox.
In his famous essay, The Methodology of Positive Economics, Milton Friedman took this
line of defense a step further by arguing that not only was a model’s complete accuracy not
necessary for it to be sufficiently explanatory, but that criticisms aimed at economics’s level of
“realism” are wholly irrelevant to the discipline’s pursuit of developing a robust positive
science.11 According to Friedman, the true measure of a model's scientific power is its usefulness
in generating accurate predictions about phenomena not yet observed. Indeed, a model’s ability
to produce these predictions is sufficient to call it explanatory, even if‒and curiously‒especially
if it is descriptively false in an appropriate way:
A hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common
and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding
the phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone.
50
Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics" I n Essays In Positive Economics
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966)
10
11
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To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it
takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since
its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.12
It is worth noting that Friedman’s tone suggests he is not convinced of the appropriateness of an
“explanatory” standard for a model’s importance in the first place. Still, his language in the
above excerpt suggests that he regards a model’s possession of predictive power as being
sufficiently explanatory for the purposes of a positive science, even if that explanation is
incomplete by the standards offered by other scholars such as Reiss and those Friedman responds
to throughout his essay. The choice-under-uncertainty model we discussed earlier would qualify
as explanatory by these standards despite its abstract nature and silence on the neurobiological
factors that actually cause one’s risk-taking behavior on a physical level. This is a dramatically
different account of explanation from the causal account, and notably, if true, it dissolves the
tension between the statements “economic models are false” and “economic models are
nevertheless explanatory” by positing that a model’s truth is largely irrelevant to the matter of its
explanatory power.
I grant Friedman’s argument on his own instrumentalist terms. In cases where it can be
shown that an economic model yields sufficiently accurate predictions about phenomena not yet
observed with a satisfactory degree of consistency, the model satisfies its purpose in the creation
of a “filing system for organizing empirical material and facilitating our understanding of it.”13
However, verification of a model through examination of only its predictive power is
unsatisfying for philosophers of science who follow stricter standards of explanation.

12
13

Friedman,
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Collin Rice is one such contemporary philosopher who‒contrary to Friedman‒has called
into question the appropriateness of treating the inaccurate parts of scientific models as
appropriate “distortions” that do not compromise the accurate and important elements of the
story that the model tells.14 Rice calls this the “decompositional” strategy, which typically carries
three common assumptions in application:
1. Target Decomposition Assumption: The real-world system is decomposable such
that the contributions of the features that are relevant to the occurrence of the
target phenomenon can be isolated from the contributions of features that are
irrelevant (or are largely insignificant) to the target phenomenon.
2. Model Decomposition Assumption: The scientific model is decomposable such
that the contributions of its accurate parts can be isolated from the contributions
of its inaccurate (that is, idealized or abstracted) parts.
3. Mapping Assumption: When successful, the accurate parts of the model can be
mapped onto the relevant parts of the real-world system and the inaccurate parts
of the model only distort the irrelevant parts of the real-world system.15
In some form or another, assumptions like these are present in virtually all idealized models of
the sort that Friedman himself embraces in his essay.16 With the highly idealized ideal gas law in
chemistry used as an example, Rice calls into question the supposed irrelevance of disturbing
forces not included in the law’s mathematical formulation: “PV = nRT where P is pressure, V is
volume, T is temperature, n is the number of moles of gas, and R is the constant.”17 Since
virtually no gas’s activity is influenced exclusively by these variables, it’s nonsense to suggest
Rice, Collin. 2019. "Models Don’t Decompose that Way: A Holistic View of Idealized
Models." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1): 179
15
Rice, 182
16
Friedman, 34
17
Rice, 190
14
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that they are the only relevant factors at work. Any kind of decompositional strategy that treats
the included variables as important and unincluded variables as irrelevant must therefore be
misguided. A similar rebuke of economic models that makes similar attempts to decompose the
variables at play would also follow along these lines, much in contrast to Friedman’s defense.
Rice instead argues that the value in these idealizations comes from their utility in aiding
mathematical analyses, which often facilitate researchers’ ability to make insights and inferences
about the phenomenon being studied to an extent not possible if they were perfectly complete,
accurate, and undistorted. This argument has notable merit. Models like the
choice-under-uncertainty model enable the kind of mathematical analysis that Rice discusses by,
for instance, enabling economists to estimate risk-utility functions based on incomplete
information. This estimation could then be used to produce credible predictions about one’s
behavior in the future, a la Friedman’s instrumentalist defense.
Rice’s and Friedman’s approaches differ in their attitudes about the acceptability or even
necessity of unrealistic assumptions as vehicles for understanding, but they appear compatible
with each other with regard to the instrumental value of models, and neither rely on a complete
causal account of the models they describe. However, one neither needs to fully abandon a
causation-based account of understanding nor turn to strict instrumentalism to defend the
explanatory power of admittedly idealised and descriptively false economic models.
Philosophers of science such as Reutlinger, Hangleiter, and Hartmann have proposed a “toy
models” approach which accepts the falseness of models, but takes them to be useful vehicles for
“grasping” an epistemically accessible, necessarily simplified understanding of otherwise
inaccessibly complex phenomena.18 Toy models allow one to “grasp” such a phenomenon if and
Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter, and Stephan Hartmann, Understanding (with) Toy
Models, 1 070
18
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only if the model enables one to “to visualize the behaviour of the target system of a scientific
toy model or to have a ‘mental model’ of the toy model and its solutions.”19 Toy models are then
divided into two categories: “autonomous” models which provide general, how-possibly
explanations of phenomena which have some factor of interest in common, and “embedded”
models which provide how-actually explanations of specific cases. How-possibly explanations
offer a conceivable way that a phenomenon could occur, and how-actually explanations outline
how a specific phenomenon actually does occur. To return to the example of individual choice
under uncertainty, the elegantly convex function of risk preference we reviewed suits Reutlinger,
Hangleiter, and Hartmann’s category of autonomous models. If we developed a perfectly
accurate utility function for a specific individual which accounts for all relevant variables left out
in the standard construction of choice under uncertainty models, that function would represent an
embedded, how-actually model. The general models featured in standard economic pedagogy
almost exclusively fall into the category of autonomous, how-possibly models.
What is the value of autonomous toy models if they do not provide how-actually
explanation? The answer lies chiefly in their utility in providing us with that sense of “grasping”
the phenomenon being described. “There are central examples of autonomous models that are
best interpreted as providing how-possibly explanations and how-possibly understanding. This
sort of understanding is valuable because it has (what we call) important modal, heuristic, and
pedagogical functions in scientific research and science education.”20 It is worth noting that
Reutlinger, Hangleiter, and Hartmann’s work is not tailored to economics in particular, so it is
not immediately clear why the notion of autonomous models is helpful in addressing economic
modelling’s failure to offer a causal account of understanding or why it is meaningfully different
19
20

Reutlinger, Hangleiter, and Hartmann, 1085
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from the instrumentalist approaches discussed earlier. Toy models in other disciplines, such as
the ideal gas law discussed by Rice, are not thought of as failing to identify causes.
To see how the autonomous/embedded model distinction can help address economic
modelling’s confusion over causes, consider the commonplace assumption of the rationality of
economic agents. While the rationality assumption is descriptively false for most if not all
individuals, it is an intuitively appealing, “graspable” norm in economics pedagogy that helps
illustrate the dynamics at play in consumer choice. When introducing a concept such as choice
under uncertainty, it makes sense to begin by introducing a theoretical risk-taking agent whose
choices make the most rational sense from an economic efficiency standpoint. For a rational
person, a comparison between expected utility a nd utility(expected value) would be a
descriptively accurate account of the cause of that person’s behavior. Irrational behavior from
real individuals can be thought of as deviations from that norm, similar to how choice and
judgment errors are conceptualized in behavioral economics. Still, any approach that restricts
conventional economic modelling to only how-possibly explanations tacitly admits that all
models but the most granularly, even impossibly specialized ones cannot offer descriptively
accurate causal accounts. Even if they could, those causes would be expressed in the abstract
imagery and formal mathematics of economic models instead of in terms of “deeper” causes of
economic behavior, like neurological activity.
At this point, one may take away from the literature that it is futile to look to economic
models for a causal account of understanding when it is clear that they do not offer one. The
more promising inquiry lies in searching for an account of understanding that is not completely
and accurately causal, but not entirely instrumental or pedagogical either. But is this a reasonable
goal? Verrault-Julien describes philosophers’ tendency to clutch to a complete and accurate
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causal account of understanding in terms of two conventional epistemological tenets: that one
possesses understanding of a phenomenon if and only if “1) one has knowledge of causes and 2)
that knowledge is provided by an explanation.”21 These tenets jointly make up what
Verrault-Julien calls the “Narrow Knowledge Account of Understanding.” The “narrow”
description of the account is appropriate; for an abstract, idealized economic model, meeting
these two criteria seems to be an almost insurmountable challenge. However, Verrault-Julien
provides good reasons to suspect that this account of understanding is untenable:
First, the literature on non-causal explanations provides good reasons to believe that
causal knowledge is not necessary for understanding. Second, as I have argued, there are
cases of theoretical modelling that do not provide explanations and yet, according to
practitioners and philosophers, afford understanding. This indicates that having an
explanation is also not necessary for understanding.22
Theoretical modelling that does not give a full account of causes is prevalent in the natural
sciences, but is still thought of as offering explanation. Verrault-Julien lists notable examples of
these, namely phlogiston theory in chemistry, which is thought to explain combustion, and the
“Hawk-Dove’ model in evolutionary biology, which is thought to explain evolution under
pressures of animal competition.23 These are both how-possibly explanations because if the
conditions outlined in the situations they describe were satisfied, it would be conceivable for
them to result in the target systems we observe in the real world. However, Verrault-Julien notes
that both, while carrying valid internal logic and offering coherent, possible explanations, are
still clearly inaccurate representations of the target phenomenon that they hope to explain when
additional empirical facts about that phenomenon are taken into account. Nevertheless,
Verreault-Julien, Understanding Does Not Depend on (Causal) Explanation, 1
Verrault-Julien, 9
23
Verrault-Julien, 7
21

22
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philosophers and scientists think of them as affording explanation, despite clearly failing to meet
the criteria necessary for the narrow knowledge account of explanation. How can this be?
Verrault-Julien contends that this is because the narrow knowledge account of
understanding is too restrictive of an account of the necessary conditions to obtain
understanding. He then supplements this account with another account of understanding: the
broad knowledge account of understanding. This account is only slightly different from the one
offered by Reutliner et al. According to the broad knowledge account of understanding, the
relationship between an explanation and its target system affords understanding if and only if the
following conditions hold:
● Possibility condition:  The generalizations G1,...,Gm, the auxiliary statements S1,...,Sn, or
the explanandum statement E are (im)possible according to the relevant modal
interpretation and epistemic goal.
● Implication condition: Generalizations G1,...,Gm with the auxiliary statements S1,...,Sn
logically entail E or a conditional probability P (E|S1,...,Sn).
● Dependency condition: G1,...,Gm support at least one counterfactual between S1,...,Sn
and E.24
Put another way, all the conditions contained in a model must be internally, logically possible
and also conceivably possible within the physical world, the conditions must imply the
outcome-phenomenon the model hopes to describe, and there must be a conceivable case where
that outcome-phenomenon does not take place. So, for instance, our choice-under-uncertainty
model meets all of these conditions because the risk preference function in it is logically and
physically possible, a rational person would act on the information captured in the model in the

24

Verrault-Julien,
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way it says he will, and one can easily imagine ways to falsify the dynamics the model describes
in a Popperian sense.
This account differs from the narrow account in two ways: 1) It asserts that causal
knowledge is not necessary and 2) It asserts that having an explanation is not necessary.25 This is
a very accommodating standard for understanding. Not only does it permit understanding from
how-possibly explanations like the Hawk-Dove model, but it also provides an apparent opening
for understanding from highly idealized and abstract economic models, even if they cannot
provide explanations through analysis of causes. With the insights of Verrault-Julien and others
in mind, we are prepared to re-examine the explanation paradox and judge the extent of the
problem it poses for economic modelling’s ability to explain, afford understanding, and inform
policy.
The Paradox Reconsidered
Verrault-Julien’s broad knowledge account of understanding offers a framework for
descriptively false economic models to offer understanding, but not necessarily full causal
explanation through how-possibly explanation. Let us reconsider each of the explanation
paradox’s three premises with Verrault-Julien’s account of understanding in mind, particularly
with respect to what it does and does not say we can gain from abstract, idealized modeling.
(1) Economic models are false.
If we consider economic models to be abstract and idealized how-possibly explanations,
as suggested by Rice, Verrault-Julien, and Reutlinger et al, then it follows that they are false in
the sense that they are not descriptively accurate or comprehensive of all factors at play in the
vast majority of cases. Where models may be true is in their identification of general
relationships between some number of variables, which are most easily demonstrated when other
25
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disturbing forces are omitted for the sake of clarity. Ergo, the model demonstrates a true
relationship in an abstract, and therefore untrue world. This demonstration can carry valuable
heuristic and practical purposes, but there is a difference between stating that something could be
true and stating that something is, in fact, true.
Moreover, microeconomic modelling does not only omit or distort causes, it often
substitutes them for false ones as well. Consider the fundamental principle of rational choice
theory: rationality. The rationality assumption is essential for models to be mathematically
coherent, but constructing a choice space for a rational individual relies on examining only their
stated preferences and intentions as explanations for their actions. What is wrong with doing
this? Rosenberg argued that this sort of thinking is a principle of outdated and incorrect folk
psychology.26 Consider a jogger who, when asked why she voluntarily incurs pain and
exhaustion every morning to jog for 45 minutes, answers that she is doing so in order to stay
healthy. She may well be answering honestly, and an economist would take her response to be a
statement of what she is willing to pay in exchange for the benefits of improved physical health.
This is what Rosenburg would say risks veering into folk psychology. The jogger’s stated or
even believed reasons for jogging may not be the real explanation. Perhaps the real reason she
jogs is because her body produces endorphins while she exercises, and her addiction to them
compels her to exercise each morning. A psychological pressure such as this can’t be built into a
model based on rational choice. In the jogger’s case, taking her rational calculus between the
expected costs and benefits of jogging to be explanatory would not just be a distortion of the
causes of her actions, it would be a substitution of a true cause for a false one. Because economic

26
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models are so idealized, abstract, and tell descriptively false stories about why people do what
they do, I grant the premise that economic models are false.
(2) Economic models are nevertheless explanatory
“Explanatory” is the key word here. Despite intuitions to the contrary, there are good
reasons to doubt that economic models can be considered explanatory by any conventional
standard.27 Reiss discusses this at length in his breakdown of the explanation paradox. Causal
accounts of explanation are by far the most popular in the philosophy of science, but as we have
already discussed, these tend to be “idealized away” in economic modelling to the point where
they cannot hope to match the circumstances of any empirical situation which we hope to
explain. While this account of explanation is the most important to address because of its
popularity, Reiss also rejects accounts that follow Philip Kitcher’s unificationist theory and
notions of mathematical explanation. In both cases, Reiss contends that economic “explanations”
are not empirically vindicated to the degree that these other accounts require. 28

Recall that Verrault-Julien’s broad knowledge account of understanding permits certain
models to be used as vehicles for understanding even if they do not offer a causal explanation. A
how-possibly economic model therefore can offer understanding regardless of if it is
explanatory. However, stating that a model offers understanding merely because it tells us
something about what could, but not necessarily does happen may strike some as so minor a
concession that it is epistemologically redundant and pointless. This is not the case. To illustrate
this, consider the famous Schelling checkerboard model of racial segregation, which is a
how-possibly explanation.29 The basic premise of Schelling’s model is that different sets of
unlike individuals who are distributed into different locations across an area represented by a
Alexandrova, It’s just a feeling: why economic models do not explain, 1
Reiss, 52
29
Reiss 54
27

28
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grid will relocate themselves to satisfy their preference for a certain minimum number of
neighbors who are like themselves. So long as every individual’s satisfaction with his location
requires that there is some minimum number of neighbors who share a given characteristic with
him (typically race), the opportunity for relocation in this community will result in the
community’s voluntary self-segregation. Is this a verifiable, causal explanation of why racial
segregation continues to persist in officially desegregated communities? Of course not. To go
even further, there is little reason to believe that Schelling’s model explains any particular case
of racial segregation. However, this model does produce the meaningful and important insight
that it is possible for individuals to segregate themselves even when they are neither compelled
by a third party nor have any explicit desire to do so. This is the sense in which a how-possibly
explanation can improve our understanding of a phenomenon even without identifying its actual
causes. Similar types of value can come from economic models, but this value is not sufficient
for claiming we can accurately explain real-world phenomena. So while I reject the premise that
“economic models are nevertheless explanatory,” there are avenues for them to provide
meaningful understanding. We will return to this idea later.
(3) Only true accounts can explain
Evaluation of this claim depends on which standard of explanation we adopt. To some
degree, discussion of this point is moot since we have already reviewed Reiss’s reasoning for
why economic models do not offer how-actually explanations to begin with. Still, many
economists seem to accept this point when justifying their use of models which they know to be
false to achieve understanding. The instrumental approach advocated for by Friedman is the most
famous defense of this. Another interesting example is Robert Sugden’s “credible worlds”
account, which argues that economic models are credible representations of the world as it could
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be in accordance with a set of observed regularities.30 The difference between this account and a
general how-possibly explanation is that Sugden describes the relationships in economic models
as credible candidates for truth based on observed empirical tendencies rather than mere
possibilities for how truth could play out based on formal rules and assumptions. A credible
world, he argues, overcomes a merely possible world’s limitations for offering explanation.
Still, one cannot help but feel that these so-called ‘credible’ worlds are really just
possible worlds dressed up in more confidence and intuitive appeal. A wide variety of subjective
influences and judgments affect what happens to strike one as a credible account of some
phenomenon. Furthermore, wouldn’t anyone who proposes a how-possibly explanation base
their hypothesis on some observed tendency or credible intuition of theirs? Clearly, additional
criteria for evaluation of these worlds is needed.
We are left with the unavoidable conclusion that the necessary additional criterion for
evaluating a possible world’s explanatory power is the validation of its truth through rigorous
empirical vindication and accurate identification of the causal mechanisms at play. Perhaps more
importantly, maintaining that only a true account of a phenomenon can explain it is tantamount
to common sense. If one’s explanation of a phenomenon is simply not true, can we really say
that they explained it?
Thus, the only claim of the explanation paradox we have rejected is its second premise:
“economic models are nevertheless explanatory.” This resolves the paradox, but it also appears
to spell certain doom for the usefulness of economic modeling. This is not the case. There is still
value to be found in accounts of understanding that can accommodate false economic models.
Imagine that the explanation paradox has a cousin, “the understanding paradox,” which
goes like this:
30
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(1) Economic models are false.
(2) Economic models nevertheless afford understanding
(3) Only true accounts can afford understanding
Is this paradox valid? We already evaluated the first premise, but the second and third hold up
differently when we consider understanding instead of explanation. Per Verrault-Julien’s broad
knowledge account of understanding, we do not necessarily require identification of causes or
how-actually explanation in order to achieve understanding. How-possibly explanation can still
improve our understanding of a phenomenon through close logical analysis, just like we saw
with the example of Schelling’s checkerboard model of segregation. If our goal is to achieve
understanding instead of explanation, considering “credible worlds,” autonomous models, toy
models, and other possible explanations becomes appropriate and fruitful. The third premise of
this new “paradox,” “only true accounts can afford understanding,” is thus rejected. If the third
premise is rejected, the falseness of economic modeling is not a barrier for it to afford
understanding. Thus, the second premise, “economic models nevertheless afford understanding,”
is not challenged by economic modelling’s systemic idealization, abstraction, and distortion in
the same way that economic modelling’s capacity to explain is.
We are left with the conclusion that economic models are abstract vehicles to achieve
understanding, but not explanation of a phenomenon through close, mathematical analysis of
postulated relationships between variables of interest.
On Policy
The implications of this analysis for policy are interesting, but fairly limited. A utilitarian
approach to public policy does not require causal explanation of why its tools work (although
that is helpful if it’s available); it’s chiefly concerned with achieving a satisfactory level of
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confidence that they do work. This is where it may be helpful to reconsider Friedman’s
perspective on the methodology of positive economics. Friedman’s account of the sufficient
conditions for explanation is not compatible with Verrault-Julien’s or Reiss’s, but perhaps his
instrumental approach is sufficiently explanatory as far as policymakers need be concerned.
Recall that in his view, the purpose of economic study is not to develop an accurate record of the
causes of economic phenomena, but rather to “serve as a filing system for organizing empirical
material and facilitating our understanding of it.”31 This filing system’s success is evaluated by
its use in generating predictions about phenomena not yet observed. This style of positive
economics may be all that’s required to properly inform normative economics, i.e. policy
opinions based on empirically vindicated economic relationships.
But this does not resolve the issue. Economic modelling’s degree of success at
empirically vindicating relationships between variables is not settled. One can think of any
number of unexpected recessions or failed fiscal and monetary policy measures that theory
suggested would have worked. Historically, economists such as John Stuart Mill have often
attributed this to the typically enormous complexity of studied phenomena in the social sciences.
But this just loops us back to a problem similar to the one we encountered when judging an
abstract model’s capacity for explanation. If so many variables are left out of a model that the
model can no longer explain or predict phenomena for us, what good is it?
I contend that the answer here is not to place one’s full faith in any one model when
trying to analyze an economic event or craft policy, but rather to consider a wide body of
economic models, empirical information, and careful intuition. Aydinonat and Rodrick advocate
for a similar strategy when addressing economic modelling’s woes with explanation. In their
view, the optimal approach to explaining an economic event or fact is to assemble a menu of
31
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relevant models that share some factor in common with the target phenomenon.32 Consideration
of such a variety of models, they argue, will allow one to develop a more holistic explanation
than they would have if they simply selected one, best model. Aydinonat even recommends
something of a playbook for how to do this:
i. Determine the set of models that are relevant for the explanatory task,
ii. Assemble a list of possible explanations from the menu of possible explanatory factors
which are suggested by this set of models,
iii. Empirically verify which of these factors are actually causing the fact or event to be
explained,
iv. If available models fail to lead to a satisfactory explanation, look for other relevant
models, or build new models to expand the menu of possible explanations, and
v. Repeat the preceding steps until a satisfactory explanation is found.33
I do not claim that this avenue to explanation is any more successful than the others we have
surveyed. Assembling many models into a wide menu does not fully compensate for the
explanatory problems that each of them still possess, especially with regard to false and not
merely distorted identifications of causes such as those embedded in rational choice theory.
Instead, I bring up Aydinonat’s suggestions because they offer a promising set of principles for
one to follow to develop the sense of understanding necessary to craft economic policy. If a team
of policy makers follows all of Aydinonat’s instructions, will they have arrived at a correct
explanation of the phenomenon they hope to address? By the various accounts of explanation
laid out in this paper, probably not, but such a holistic approach‒tempered by empirical
scrutiny‒will significantly enrich their understanding of it in accordance with Verrault-Julien’s
Aydinonat, N. Emrah. 2018. "The Diversity of Models as a Means to Better Explanations in
Economics." The Journal of Economic Methodology, 237
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broad knowledge account of understanding. For instance, policy makers who want to raise the
minimum wage in an effort to reduce poverty benefit from considering the diverse body of
models that outline the possible effects of such a policy. Some models may suggest that poverty
will increase because the increased minimum wage will raise unemployment, others may suggest
that the measure will reduce poverty by giving workers more money to spend and encouraging
greater productivity. With these possibilities considered, the policy makers can then compare the
situations outlined in the models to the real-world history reflected in the empirical evidence and
judge what is likely to take place if the minimum wage is raised. Mileage will vary since some
phenomena are more complex than others, but the rich diversity of economic modelling offers
promise for developing the best possible, if still imperfect sense of understanding for crafting the
best possible, if still imperfect economic policy.
Conclusion
It is important to note that the debate over economic models’ explanatory power can
appear one-sided. A survey of the literature gives one the impression that almost anyone who
writes about the problems captured by the explanation paradox will conclude that either
economic models do not explain, or if they do, they only can with a long list of qualifications and
assumptions attached. Still, there is no lack of economists who are content to apply models
without getting caught up in methodological quandaries, so those who are confident in economic
modelling’s explanatory power may be underrepresented in this paper’s coverage of the existing
literature on the subject. Nevertheless, arguments by Reiss, Rice, and others make convincing
cases that economic models do not provide explanation. This should not be taken to mean that
economics is doomed to fail, however. Emerging subfields such as behavioral economics,
neuroeconomics, and an increasing emphasis on empirical research are worthy supplements to
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the insights offered by economic models. As we have discussed, tempering the understanding we
can achieve from models with the knowledge we gain from empirical research may provide
researchers with the insight necessary to develop effective policy. So while individual economic
models cannot provide the complete and accurate explanations that economists want, the entire
body of available models still offers promise for developing the understanding they need to do
their jobs well.
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